ABSTRACT The widespread acceptance of data sharing has promoted the relevant research in both academia and industry. ''Data sharing'' is the process of interchanging data among multiple data sources in a controllable access manner. Any such system provides common functionality of storage and access; however, there are prominent differences in non-functionalities, such as self-control, transparency, costeffectiveness, incentive, and auditing, which make data sharing in a dilemma. In this paper, we propose a distributed data sharing model based on blockchain technology: data owner publishes data with an additional control policy; data consumer inquires data with an access request; and consensus nodes evaluate the request and make decisions. After formalizing the system model, we discuss the procedure of data sharing, reputation management, and proposed solution. With the access control policy, price compensation, and reputation management mechanism, we achieve self-control and price balance in sharing data. Our model is equally a closed-loop control system that acts as a regulator of supervising its participants. The analyses and experimental results show, comparing with the existing sharing systems, that our model is practical and can spur agents to participate actively in sharing data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data sharing is a way of interchanging, integrating, retrieving and analyzing data among multiple data sources in a controllable access manner [1] . It has become the main impetus of technology innovation. However, existing data sharing technologies, such as online social network (OSN), peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing system and collaborative repository, lack the power of self-control and price-balanced compensation. And the data sharing model based on these technologies has only the fundamental data processing capacities (data owner stores data in a centralized repository and makes it accessible to data consumer by downloading it), which damages the enthusiasm of agents. Recently, with the development of distributed data storage, big data, machine learning, crowdsourcing, and data science, an emerged data sharing model
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yinghui Zhang. called decentralized data market, which emphasizes on incentive and self-control, has sprung up.
Sharing data in a decentralized way can significantly reduce costs in terms of initial investment and maintenance [2] . Further, it can lower the single point failure rate and improve reliability. Nevertheless, there still exist some challenges that need a watchful eye. And fortunately, both academia and industry have put forward the constructive suggestions (Table 1) .
However, there is no effective and efficient way to achieve controllable and balanced data sharing, which has several prominent characters. First, only data owner is the administrator of his/her data to identify the opportunities, risks and collaborations during sharing data. Second, the system only accepts requests that are in compliance with both the access control policies and privacy preferences of agents (especially data owner and data consumer). Third, data consumer inquires data in a balanced price. Fourth, all transactions are done in an auditable and traceable way. This paper strives for the above goals, and our contributions are summarized as, 1) We extend the definition of ''API (Application Programming Interface)'' with query, a more general way to convey the data retrieval requirements. And it's also more suitable for data sharing scenarios of providing the unified access control policy. 2) We employ blockchain as the control enabler.
Blockchain is an emerging technology that enables data sharing in a decentralized, autonomous, controllable transactional pattern, which is also auditable and traceable [4] . 3) Under the supervision of an identity and reputation management system, agents will take the initiative of participating in sharing data and would not compromise the protocols with others. 4) We combine attribute-based access control, purposebased privacy preservation, differential privacy and balanced price model to implement access control, privacy protection and price compensation. 5) To evaluate our proposal, we develop an early-demo system which builds on Quorum blockchain and InterPlanetary File System 1 (IPFS).
1 https://ipfs.io/ The roadmap of this paper is as follows. Section II provides some preliminaries on our model, especially, the blockchain, access control and differential privacy. Section III states some basic conceptions, such as query, identity and behavior pattern of agents. Section IV analyzes the proposed model and its essential components. Based on smart contract of blockchain, Section V details an instance based on the model stated in Section IV, while Section VI illustrates the experiment and evaluation of the model. Section VII surveys related work and compares our proposed model with these surveyed ones. Finally, Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section explains the related technologies that arise in our model, such as access control, blockchain, and differential privacy.
A. BLOCKCHAIN
Blockchain, a distributed ledger, can be modeled as an infinite state five-tuple (T , B, b 0 , δ, F). Among them, T is the set of transactions (tx i ); B is the set of blocks, which is organized in a chain structure. At time t, block B t = Hash([tx 1 , tx 2 , ..., tx n ]||B t−1 ||t); b 0 is the initial state (also called genesis block); δ (δ : B × T * → B) is the state transition function, driven by consensus mechanism; F is the terminated state (NULL).
The cryptographic technique, distributed node consensus mechanism and automated script code (smart contract) make blockchain a new distributed infrastructure and computing paradigm. Blockchain can be divided into multiple categories. And from the access mode of participants (our research motivation), we have public, private and alliance blockchain. Bitcoin and Ethereum are typical public blockchains, which are open to the public, and anyone can participate in the consensus-making. Quroum is an alliance (also be classified as private) blockchain, which is open only to a consortium (or group of individuals or organizations).
In our design, blockchain is a data sharing enabler of self-control and payoff. We just need to choose a well-suitable blockchain platform to serve our data sharing, as it's impractical and unnecessary to develop blockchain from the scratch. According to our requirements of transaction content and management mode, we choose one from Bitcoin, Ethereum and Quorum. The transaction of Bitcoin is public and has the form [16] , [17] of (y 1 , y 2 , ...y n , π x , v, t, σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ n ), where y i , σ i is the hash value (also called index) and input script of previous transaction tx i . π x , v, t is the output script, transmitted value (or currency) and time stamp respectively. With Turning-complete Solidity program language instead of input/output script in Bitcoin, Ethereum can deal complex affairs initiated by an externally account or a contract. The Ethereum transaction, a signed data (message) package, also is public and looks like (y 1 , y 2 , ...y n , v, t). Quorum, build on Ethereum, supports public and private transaction, where the information of the public transaction is accessible to all participants as in Ethereum; while only members associated with the transaction can access the details of a private transaction. Therefore, we take Quorum as our blockchain platform.
B. ACCESS CONTROL
Targeting at mediating request, access control system, consisting of subject, control policy and object, involves three fundamental functions: authentication, authorization and auditing [18] and has features, such as, tamper-proof, nonbypassable, security kernel and micromation.
Traditional access control policies: discretionary (DAC), mandatory (MAC) and role-based (RBAC), being deficient in scalability, interoperability, transparency and accountability [19] , [20] , are inadequate to fulfill distributed applications. Approaches, such as, attribute-based access control (ABAC), purpose-based access control (PBAC), Usage Control (UCON) provide a new guidance.
ABAC [21] , [22] grants or denies user requests based on attributes of user, object and environment conditions. PBAC [23] specifies the exclusive/prohibitive purposes of the given data element. Usage control [24] is built around ABC models: authorizations (A), obligations (B) and conditions (C).
C. PRIVACY AND SECURITY
Undoubtedly, privacy and security are the primary concerns of preventing data owner from sharing data [2] . Differential privacy settles the paradox of learning nothing about an individual while learning information about a population. Li et al. [11] proposes a theoretical framework for assigning prices to noisy answers as a function of their accuracy, and for dividing the price among data owners who deserve compensation as their loss of privacy.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [25] 
Before plunging into the details of our model, we summarize the notations (Table 2 ) used in this paper.
III. BEHAVIOR PATTERN OF AGENTS
In a typical data sharing system, there are three types of agents: data owner (O, providing data), data consumer (C, inquiring data) and service provider (P, serving O and C). We focus on their individual behaviors (Section III) and interactions (Section IV) of these agents.
First of all, we discuss query, the key point of the interaction.
A. QUERY
Query, an interface between C and O, forms the key component of our model. It's also known as SafeAnswer in OpenPDS [26] , API or SCI in operation system, SQL query in database system and service in cloud computing platform. 
There are three key points in this definition that need to be highlighted: data type (corresponding to data instance), dataset and condition. Data type and data instance are similar to the formal and actual parameter of the function in programming language. Data type (t) is also known as attribute of data, and the set of potential values relating to this type is data instance (t).
We assume there exists a data type operator (θ) which maps data instance to data type, i.e.,
Specially, the process that C inquires data from dataset d is equivalent to a call to a query q (instantiation of (2)). So, we have,õ
whereĩ (θ (ĩ) = i, according to (3)), is the input data instances provided by C, andõ (θ (õ) = o) is the answers of the query q. When inquiring information from the specific dataset, C must provide data instances (called input data instances)ĩ to identify them or to present their intended purposes of using the output dataõ. This extra information is set by O for the purpose of preserving their data privacy and it contributes the notable difference of our model with others. Table 3 shows some examples of queries (which will be evaluated in Section VI). And after discussing the query control, we will rewrite the query in Section III-C.
To search for ''query'' effectively and efficiently, we need to modify the traditional inverted index structure by adding query information to the index so as to construct inverted index based on query (iibq), used like API search engine. 2 an inverted index based on query is an index structure about a dataset, and it contains three basic components: the query information, metadata about dataset, address of smart contract and it looks like
where, a sc is the address of smart contract, in which the control information of dataset about the query is stored (Section V-A).
B. AGENT's IDENTITY
Every agent can change his/her public-key addresses of Ethereum (on which Quorum is built), and he/she can also modify his/her real identity information. It's necessary to establish a compound identity, containing Ethereum address and real identity information, to bind the agent with his/her reputation, which can enhance the convincingness and trustworthiness of our model [15] . The real information, such as the credit card number, PIN-code, biometric data, IP address, name or address of their organization, which is bound up with an agent, is known as its real identity (RealIdentityInfo). It's obvious that the real identity involves the agent's privacy, which should not be public and be also impractical to store it into the blockchain nodes. However, the real identity is necessary when we consider agent's accountability. To reconcile this issue, we store the encrypted RealIdentityInfo into IPFS and have the hash value returned from IPFS, written as ID, logged into the blockchain nodes. As ID is accessible and verifiable, without contextual ambiguity, we call ID the real identity information of an agent.
The triples, Ethereum address, real identity (ID) and the reputation token (RpToken, Section IV-C), consist of agent's compound identity (comIdentity). 
The agent's reputation token does not alter when its Ethereum address or (and) its real identity info changes under compound identity [15] .
C. AGENT's BEHAVIOR
We now discuss the behavior of agents, including O, C and P.
1) DATA OWNER
It's widely accepted that O shares data for certain purposes, such as for accountability, online resource, economic compensation. Simply, we only consider economic compensation.
To share data with others effectively, in addition to data and its related metadata information, O provides extra info to guarantee his/her rights and duties. This additional info includes access control policy acp, privacy preference ppo, compensation contract w, commitment service time δ, maximum privacy budget ε 0 and query set Q s .
Access control policy (acp) is the set of access control rules.
In which, access control rule (acr) is a licensing rule to a request initialized by C with inputsĩ to invoke query q.
A request to O is permitted if and only if all the inputs provided by C are consistent with any one rule in acp. The reader can refer to paper [27] to find the meanings of rules and the combinational operations about them.
Generally speaking, a robust privacy protection system should safeguard privacy at each step relating to data gathering, analyzing and using. For example, desensitization technology of gathering data, secure multi-party computation and differential privacy of analyzing data, restrictions on the purpose of using data.
Privacy preferences describe the requirement of personalized privacy protection of using data. Not only O but also C has his/her privacy preferences. We first focus on the definition of privacy preferences on O, and it's held to C.
Privacy preference of O (ppo) is the set of privacy preference rules of O. ppo := ppro − set (9) where, privacy preference rule of O (ppro) describes the exclusive/prohibitive purposes specified or promised by O for data of type t. e.g., for data type t, we can define ppro t as,
where, the type t (t ∈ i ∪ o) is deduced from the input and output of query q (when t ∈ i, ppro t is the privacy preference rule promised by O when validating data from C; whereas t ∈ o, ppro t is the privacy preference rule specified by O, and C, when exploiting O's data, must comply with it). p is a tuple < OF, NF > (the abbreviation for ''only for'' and ''not for''). Concretely, OF (NF resp.) stands for the exclusive purpose set (the prohibitive purpose set resp.) for which the attribute t could be used (not be used).
As we know, O shares data in return for certain economic compensation, which is guaranteed by the compensation contract.
Definition 3 (Compensation Contract): Compensation contract (w) is the minimum compensation presented by O when sharing their data, and C must pay for inquiring O's data. It's a function of privacy loss and data quality.
For data type t j , the compensation contract w j is,
where the parameter ε j is the privacy loss of the type t j for a query q, and p j is the self-defined reference price about type t j . The value of p j is also determined by other factors, such as the privacy attitude of O, the quality of data.
As in differential privacy, for any nonzero query, privacy loss is only related to query mechanism and dataset. We can fix the privacy loss parameter ε j to a fixed value (ε) for each different query of a dataset, and the contract can be rewritten as,
where A j is the price weight of data type t j , and c ≥ 0 is a constant that determines compensation rate due to privacy loss. Based on (2), (7), (9), (12), we can redefine query q (2) as,
For the same or different attributes of a dataset, O may provide multiple queries (we call them query set (Q s )).
Attaching with control policy, O shares data in return for compensation. The pattern of O is,
During the commitment time δ, O promises to maintain and update his/her data; otherwise, he/she will be fined (Section V-B). The privacy budget ε 0 (when it's down up to zero or under the lower bound value of differential privacy, no more query is permitted.) is a means of measuring the privacy loss of O.
Before publishing dataset, O should extract metadata from the original dataset. There are two types of metadata, index and test metadata. The index metadata contain timestamps, file format, provenance, schemas (or attributes), content summaries, user-provided annotations, semantics [28] , query set and its input/output type pairs, etc. The test metadata, referring to the partial desensitization data from the original dataset, are a reference of ascertaining the query accuracy and used to validate the price of data. Metadata are publicly accessible and stored off-chain in IPFS. Though, the index and search interface of dataset should be constructed and provided, it's out of the scope of this paper.
Example 1: Bank Marketing dataset [29] , an open dataset relating with direct marketing campaigns in Portuguese (Table 4 shows partial samples), contains sensitive information, including age, job, marital, education, contracts and balance, all of which should be protected properly. We get a query set Q s = {q 3 , acp, ppo, w} (14) , and the
Providing with access request and data accuracy requirement, C aims at inquiring useful information for his/her special purpose. We now discuss the behavior of C.
Similar to privacy preference of O, privacy preference of C (ppc) is the set of privacy preference rule of C (17) .
Privacy preference rule of C (pprc) normalizes the exclusive/prohibitive purposes specified or promised by C for data of type t. For data type t, we can define pprc t as,
Being opposite to ppro t , if t ∈ i, pprc t is the privacy preference rule specified by C, and O must comply with it on validating C's data; if t ∈ y (y ∈ o), pprc t is the privacy preference rule promised by C on exploiting O's data.
The set of the access requests (called access request set (ar s )),
To inquire informationỹ (θ(ỹ) = y and y ⊆ o), C needs to provide input dataĩ(θ (ĩ) = i) and data accuracy requirement. Access request (ar) is a quadruples: the input (i), output (y), accuracy (v) and privacy preference (ppc) (16),
where, v ≥ 0, is a real, representing the maximum error tolerance of a query submitted by C. It's an upper bound of the variance in Laplace different privacy mechanism, and also determines the price C should pay. Now, we can give the formal behavior patterns of C based on (6), (18) .
C inquires data with the requirements of accuracy and privacy preferences. The behavior pattern of C is, C :: = Identity : comIdentity ar s : ar − set (20) Note, it's obvious that there exists a certain relationship between query set Q s and access request set ar s . For C, access request is their general requirement and condition to inquire data. For O, query is the interface of exporting data.
On one hand, the input dataĩ, always containing the C's confidential information (identity, role, age, etc.) and other environment information generated automatically according to system status, such as IP address, access time, which is privacy to C. As this info is exposed to O to validate C's access right, O must comply with the privacy preference specified by C.
On the other hand, the intended purpose, which should be consistent with privacy preferences of O, is also contained in C's privacy preferences.
Example 2: Continuing with Example 1, C, with compound identity comIdentity, searches for data 'contracts' (i.e., y) above certain value with the expected accuracy v = 1000. Ideally, he/she will find query q3.
1) C defines the privacy preference (16) as,
2) The access request set (18) is
3) The behavior pattern of C (20) is
There exist many service models, such as honesty, curiosity and malware model, but they are outside the scope of this paper. We only think P as an ideal service host that strictly enforces the related protocols, such as data storage, computation, transmission. Blockchain node, acting as logger and contract executor, is a special service provider and controller in our model. The control process, also known as consensus-making, is achieved through access control and privacy preservation.
The process of access control involves four steps: matching the request, matching access control policy, matching privacy preferences and balancing price (Section IV-B). Datasets, validated by these steps, become tradable and its owner has the chance of getting compensation.
To preserve privacy, we employ differential privacy technology and set the maximum privacy budget ε 0 for each dataset. According to the privacy consumption ε i (L Q ) of each query, only the query with privacy consumption, adding to the total privacy consumption of previous queries, being less than or equal to the maximum privacy budget, i.e., ε i (L Q ) ≤ ε 0 , should be accepted.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In terms of function, the proposed model should provide: 1) data aggregation and sale (by O), 2) data retrieval and purchase (by C), 3) persistence of data and logs, heavy computation, consensus (by P). It is important to note that any agent in our model may have different roles at different times. The interactions among these agents are as follows:
Attaching with control policy and compensating contract, O publishes his/her dataset by exposing the query or queries. Then, C can inquire data by specifying target data characteristics (type) and criteria (accuracy, budget). The blockchain nodes (P), acting as mediators, fulfill access decision and price compensation protocol trustfully and unbiased. Being different from sharing the whole dataset as the early data sharing systems, our model adopts the ''SafeAnswer'' [26] mechanism: only answered information from a controllable and price-balanced query can be transferred from O to P or to C.
Based on the above discussion and inspired by the technology of blockchain [4] , [10] , [12] , [13] , [15] , [19] , [20] , [30] - [33] , we design our data-market-based decentralized data sharing architecture (Fig. 1) . The overall processes (a concrete solution in Section V) of our architecture are as follows.
1) O compiles query (or set of queries) for their dataset, and uses the input and output type item of the query to construct an inverted index. 2) O uploads their control policy to the IPFS. The hash address returned from IPFS network and the hash values of its contents (for integrity verification) are logged into the blockchain nodes through smart contract. 3) The model uses the address of the smart contract to modify the inverted index of the query (by adding the item of a sc ). 4) When inquiring data, C, with access request, retrieves the query (or queries) in index database, and further, obtains the control policy of datasets through the address of the contract. 5) The related set of nodes make use of the decision logical provided by FACPL (Formal Access Control Policy Language [20] ) to validate the request with the control policy about the retrieved query, information about C or system environment, and use the balanced price mechanism to check the privacy budget. 6) The agreement (or disagreement) (that the policy related to the request initiated by C is in accordance with access control policies and privacy preferences of O is known as agreement (referring to (27) and (32)), otherwise disagreement) and the costs of the request are returned to C. 7) If C agrees to the current transaction, he/her submits the formal query request, including the query information, data accuracy requirements and the deposits, all of them are stored in the blockchain network. 8) The nodes deal with the orders coordinately under differential privacy and deliver the answers to C through a secure https communication channel. 9) Payment is completed among O, C and the related P according to the payment protocol.
B. SHARING PROCEDURE
By registering into the model, O can build queries to publish their dataset following the steps of Example 1 in Section III-C.1. In this section, we mainly consider the procedure of inquiring data in the light of C.
When an access request sequence comes in the form of ar s (the instances of C), four steps will be triggered. Here we give the details of related steps and make them convenient for implementing with FACPL.
1) MATCHING REQUEST
When a request enters our model, the request-query matching check is triggered first.
According to (2) , (19) , a matchable request (with a query) should satisfy the following two conditions.
where, i O (i C resp.) is the input item of a query (request). The former is set by O, and the latter, including the system environment information, is provided by C. Meanwhile, o O is the output of a query, and y C is the expected output of a request.
2) MATCHING ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
Further, to be accepted by our model, the matched request (called valid request) should meet the access control policies. Formally, if ar (ar ∈ ar s ) is a valid request, according to (8) , (7) According to (9) , (10), (14) we have,
For each data type t, if oofpi(t) ⊆ cofpi(t) holds, it indicates that C's data about t are used not beyond the exclusive purpose specified by C. Similarly, if cnfpi(t) ⊆ onfpi(t) holds, it can be concluded that the C's data are used not beyond the prohibitive purpose specified by C.
So, if (27) holds, C's privacy preference is preserved.
∀t ∈ ar.i oofpi(t) ⊆ cofpi(t) ∧ cnfpi(t) ⊆ onfpi(t) (27)
Similarly, we can deduce the condition that matches O's privacy preference.
Definition 6 (Set of Exclusive/Prohibitive Purposes on Owner's Output Data): For each data type t (t ∈ ppro.o), the set of exclusive/prohibitive purposes on O's output data (oofpo/onfpo) determines the set of exclusive/prohibitive purposes of using data of type t based on O's preferences.
According to (9) , (10), (14):
Definition 7 (the Set of Exclusive/Prohibitive Purposes on Data used by Data Consumer): For each data type t (t ∈ pprc.o), the set of exclusive/prohibitive purposes on data used by C (cofpo/cnfpo) determines the set of exclusive/prohibitive purposes when C use data of type t based on C's preferences.
According to (16) , (17) , (19) :
And, if (32) holds, C's privacy preference is preserved.
∀t ∈ ar.y cofpo(t) ⊆ oofpo(t) ∧ onfpo(t) ⊆ cnfpo(t)
Equations (27) and (32) simplify the policy evaluation which depends on ''deny-unless-permit-greedy'' combining strategy in FACPL.
4) BALANCING PRICE
To compensate O and the related consensus nodes, the total price paid by C (π (Q s )) must be greater than or equal to the amount of compensations ( i µ i (Q)). That's to say, π (Q s ) ≥ i µ i (Q). And the difference determines the compensation lines to P. Furthermore, π (Q s ) and µ i (Q) should be arbitrage-free or micro-arbitrage-free.
We adopt the balanced pricing framework introduced by Li [11] and extend it to support personalized price mechanism.
C pays (π(Q s )) for retrieving data, and these payments are used to compensate O (µ i ) for his/her privacy loss ε i according to the compensation protocol w i .
Definition 8 (Balanced Price Model [11]): A price model (π, ε, µ, w) is balanced if: (1) π is arbitrage-free, (2) the micro payment functions µ are fair, micro-arbitrage-free, cost recovering for π and compensation for w.
Proposition 1: Letting L be Laplacian mechanism and the compensation contract of privacy loss for type j (w j (ε, p j ) = A j · c · ε) be linear, for m attributes and n data owners, the micro payment to data owner i be
The Proof of Proposition 1.
The inequality is correct because in Laplacian query mechanism ε(L Q ) ≤ S q / √ v/2, where S q is the sensitivity of query q [11] .
As the local sensitivity S q risks leaking privacy, we exploit the aged data model [34] to predict the sensitivity of query S q .
From the analysis above, we see that O has been compensated (at least) µ i (Q) for privacy loss S q / √ v/2, and the privacy budget of his/her dataset will be cut down by S q / √ v/2, being ε 0 − S q / √ v/2. So far, we have achieved the goal of self-control and pricebalance. 
C. REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
To evaluate agents' credibility, an appropriate reputation management mechanism is necessary in our model. This section will expatiate the contents related to reputation management of agents.
1) REPUTATION TOKEN
Intuitively, the reputation token (34) , an alternative sigmoid function about the number of positive and negative evaluation in the i'th trade or transaction, is an ideal tool to evaluate agents' reputations.
In (34), α is the step size (we set α = 5). p, n is the number of positive, negative evaluation.
Suppose in a specified period, there are N (N ∈ [1, ∞)) time slots (such as hours, days, years), we can get the cumulative reputation token (35) of one agent.
However, reputation token or cumulative reputation token can't reflect the character of the user behavior changes with time. To model this, we employ reputation score [15] .
2) CALCULATION OF REPUTATION SCORE
As discussed above, we need a means to describe the dynamic behavior of agents. And the factor of reputation fluctuation [15] , derivation from the mean value and standard deviation of probability theory, just meets this requirement. Its computation is as follows. 1) Mean Value (X ) and standard deviation (S) of the reputation token. In the N (N ∈ [1, ∞)) time slots during the particular period, let r i = RpToken i −RpToken i−1 (i ∈ N ), we get r 1 , r 2 , ..., r N . And let r ij denote the j'th calculation r i . Then,
and S ij is
2) Ranking score (Rs(n)). Rearranging all agents by the standard deviations in ascending order at time j within a specified period, and marking each different standard deviation value a consecutive number. We call this marked number as the deviation ranking score. Table 5 shows a typical example. 3) ranking ratio (Rr(n)). The actual ranking score to the maximum value, Rr(n) = Rs(n)/k × 0.5 (calibrated to [0,0.5]) 4) The factor of reputation fluctuation (Rpf n ), as,
After getting the cumulative token and factor of reputation fluctuation, we can get the reputation score as,
Comparing with RpToken, R is more suitable to describe the dynamic behavior of agents.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
There have three types of agents in proposed data sharing model: data owner (O), data consumer (C), service provider (P) (including blockchain nodes (N , especially the consensus cluster nodes)) and five kinds of smart contract: consensus contract (CC), register contract (RC), demand contract (DC), service contract (SC) and enforcement contract (EC). Fig. 2 outlines the typical agents and their interactions with data and/or smart contracts.
A. SOLUTION DESCRIPTION
The contents of these contracts and their interactions are: 1) Agents' identity verification. No matter what kind of agent, joining in our model, should be validated by consensus contract, which stores the identity of agents, and if necessary, deletes agents that are no longer working or harmful as described by Dagher [4] . 2) Query and policy construction. O publishes his/her query set, and at the same time, uploads control policy to P (IPFS and their related components). There exist two kinds of hash values, the hash value of the content of the control policy ((CP) H ) and the hash value ((CP) A ) returned from IPFS. (CP) A is the address of the control policy (both the access control policy and the privacy preference). 3) Dataset register. After obtaining the hash value of control policy, O calls register contract, which records their basic information, such as the compound identity, name of dataset, (CP) A , (CP) H , committed service time, value of the maximum privacy budget, compensation contract w, deposits and mining bounty. The address of register contract is also written into the inverted index based on query (5). 4) Access request. Submitting access request through demand contract, C can inquire data. Demand contract is used to store the entity of the request, namely the combination of access requests (i, y, v, ppc) and C's identity. 5) Query retrieval. According to the access request, demand contract will trigger consensus nodes cluster (we call these nodes PDP (Policy Decision Point) consensus nodes) to retrieve query that matches the request. 6) Get contract address. According to the query returned from the retrieval of step 5, the contract address a sc of dataset is returned to PDP consensus nodes. 7) Get decision information. The PDP, on the first hand, through the contract address a sc , gets the control policy about the query, the remaining budget of dataset, committed service time, etc. And the hash value (CP) H is used to validate whether the control policy has been modified. 8) Get environment information. While, on the other hand, the PDP acquires environment information about the system, such as the system time, IP of the agent. 9) Decision. The PDP matches the strategy (access control, privacy preference, balanced price and privacy consumption in Section IV-B.) and sends the decisions to C. 10) Query Service. If C agrees to the current decision (if necessary, C may renegotiate with O in order to get permission), he/she will initiate service contract, which stores C's deposit, query and its own status. 11) Service Enforcement. Service contract calls the enforcement contract, which serves C's request under differential privacy. 12) Access permission. First, the EC delivers the request to O, and asks for his/her permission. This request will be logged by O. 13) Confirmation. The permission of O will be passed to both EC and P. 14) Assemble privacy consensus nodes. Second, again, the EC assembles consensus nodes that confuse data to guarantee differential privacy. 15) Send original answers. P sends the answers to the query to consensus nodes for confusing. 16) Confusion. EC consensus node clusters confuse data under differential privacy and send the result to C.
B. PAYMENT SOLUTION
In our model, O with certain deposits, which may be redeemed back if he/she is honesty, pledges to keep data available during the ''commitment time''; otherwise, he/she will be fined according to penalty factor (40) and lost partial deposits.
In (40) t failure , t start , t end is the service failure time, commitment starting service time and commitment ending service time, respectively. It's obvious that t start ≤ t failure ≤ t end , i.e., 0 ≤ pf ≤ 1.
If O withdraws their dataset before service ending time, they will redeem the deposit only deposit · (1 − pf ). At the same time, for sharing data with others, O harvests p (41),
where µ n (Q), being proportional to µ i (Q), is the profit of n'th transaction, M is the total number of transactions, and bounty is the rewards for consensus nodes. For C, the minimum expenditure of one transaction is,
C. SOLUTION DISCUSSION
Sharing data under the untrusted distributed computing environment is challenging. To achieve the goal of self-control and balanced-price, we propose a novel method which grants C access to a query Q if and only if: 1) The request ar, (ar ∈ ar s (18) , (19) ) matches the query Q (21). 2) There exist an access control rule in the query Q (13) compatible with the request ar (22). 3) C's privacy preferences (9) are not in conflict with the privacy preferences of O (16). The matching procedures of privacy preferences is stated in Section IV-B.3. 4) The price paid by C can compensate both O and P (Section IV-B.4). In summary, our model has the following properties. Property 1: Agents are credible and trustworthy. First, the compound identity (6) of agent ensures that reputation token does not change with agent's Ethereum address or his/her real identity info, which is mutable. Second, reputation score (39) , being dynamic, is better than reputation token to character the truthfulness of agent's participation in affairs. Last, the Raft-based consensus mechanism of Quorum, adding or deleting agents according to their reputation score, partly enhances the willingness of the agent to abide by the protocol. (If not, he/she will be fined (41) as Section V-B).
Property 2: Data sharing is entirely under O's control. At the beginning of each commitment period, O can update their access control policies (7) or privacy preferences (9), (16) as they please. At the same time, the matching of access control policies (22) and privacy preferences (27) , (32) , completed by consensus node cluster of blockchain, is impartial. Meanwhile, in our design, data access is transparent and perceivable to O, who may deny the current access.
Property 3: The price mechanism is balanced and personalized.
Definition 8 and Proposition 1 denote that our price mechanism is balanced. Further, O can set the price weight (A j ) of type t j and the compensation rate, which embody personalization. In addition, O's profit (41) and C's minimum expenditure (42) make our price mechanism more reasonable and practical.
Property 4: The computing environment is credible.
Property 5:
The model meets the requirements of data security and privacy preservation.
Property 4 and 5 are mainly based on the following characteristics of blockchain technology: decentralization, transparency and trust, immutability, security, auditability and traceability. In addition, the "SafeAnswer" mechanism guarantees only the safe answers do leave outside the control of O, which also ensures the privacy and confidentiality of O's data. In the data security aspect, we utilize Quorum's security mechanism, such as, secure https communication channel, private data transactions, peer-to-peer encrypted message exchanges for directed transfer of confidential data to other network agents.
VI. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
We have built an early prototype that integrates Quorum blockchain network (an enhanced Ethereum blockchain smart contract platform), IPFS file system (an efficient distributed file storage system), Laplace differential privacy mechanism and access control based on FACPL.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To evaluate our self-controllable and balanced data sharing model, first of all, we need a permission blockchain network supporting private transactions (contracts), peer-to-peer encrypted message exchanges for directed transfer of confidential data among agents, and higher-performance consensus mechanisms. As section II-A, we have chosen Quorum 3 and, based on it, built a simple system consisting of five nodes: three traders (two data owners and one data consumer), one regulator (service provider), and one observer which cannot access the private data. These five nodes can be dynamically added or removed according to their reputation scores (by now, we have only implemented the adding or removing nodes manually). And we have a preference for Raft-based consensus (Istanbul BFT consensus or Clique POA consensus is an alternative option) to achieve our network consistency.
Secondly, we need a repository to store our huge amount of data, especially dataset and the access control policy. IPFS 4 is a global, versioned and decentralized file system that is content-addressed and identified by its hash value. This file hash can be easily stored in blockchain. Therefore, IPFS is an ideal file storage and sharing platform for decentralized data sharing. We have IPFS in its default configuration among blockchain network nodes.
Thirdly, we need an FACPL component to act as PDP or PEP (Policy Enforcement Point). We have chosen the Eclipse-based java software toolchain 5 at consensus nodes to take on PDP. Whereas the PEP is implemented by smart contract, which is written in Solidity, 6 a programming language for Ethereum or Quorum. The interactions between smart contract and FACPL components are implemented by web3j 7
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
We use three real datasets in our experiments: credit card, bank and student, which are held by two nodes. The credit card, including 30000 instances with 24 attributes (sex, education, marriage, and age are our main concerns), is about the default payments in Taiwan. Bank dataset contains 45211 instances with 17 attributes (age and contacts are our main concerns). And the student dataset, including 649 instances with 33 attributes (age, Dalc and Walc are our main concerns), is used to approach student achievement in secondary education of two Portuguese schools.
1) UTILITY MEASUREMENT
Data utility, measured by the noise added to query results, is proportional to privacy budget and inverse to the maximum error tolerance (variance) specified by C. Instead of directly outputting noised result of the query, we limit the result to an empirical value f /ε. If and only if the follow condition is satisfied, the query result can proceed to output.
whereq(D) and q(D) are the true and the noised result respectively.
At the same time, mean squared error (mse), the deviation between the true result and the noisy answer, is used to measure data utility.
2) VARIANCE AND OUTPUT
As a simple example, we simulate five types of queries as Table 3 .
For different queries, we make variance vary in 10, 100, 200, 500, 1000, 2000, 4000, 5000, 6000 respectively. Fig. 3 shows the output of the query q1. From Fig. 3 , we can see that, with the increase of query variance, the number of effective queries also increases, but the outputs deviate more from the true value.
We also record the number of valid queries about different variance (or price paid by C). Suppose we have privacy compensation constant (c) 2, 3, 4 about the queries q1-q5 (Table 3 ) and matrix of attribute weight (A ij ) as Table 6 . For query q1, we get the relation among variance, epsilon, number of valid queries, mean squared error and payments as Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 indicates that the larger the query variance is, the smaller the epsilon is (Fig. 4a) . At the same time, the number of queries (Fig. 4b) , the mean squared error (Fig. 4c ) and the total payments (Fig. 4d ) of all possible queries increase (in the case of epsilon exhaustion) with the decrease of epsilon under a certain probability, which is consistent with the arbitrage-free.
We also test the hybrid queries consisting of q1 to q5. For brevity, the symbol q(v) represents a query q with variance v.
Assuming a set of queries of Q s = {q 1 (500), q 2 (500), q 3 (5000), q 4 (5000), q 5 (5000)} was published to the system, we get the privacy cost and payments information of accessing the three datasets as Fig. 5 . Fig. 5 . indicates that the privacy cost of datasets is consistent with their payments.
3) EVALUATION OF REPUTATION
The reputation score is bound up with the Cumulative Token or the variation of Reputation Token. Similar to [15] , we got the Reputation Token (Table 7) of five users in ten time slots on one period and the variations of reputation scores as Fig. 6 . For user 1, his reputation score increases stably, as he is an active participant. User 2 also has an increased score, but the growth rate of his reputation score is slower than that of user 1, as his reputation token is constant. User 3's reputation token increases irregularly, and his reputation score grows slower than that of user 2. User 4, 5 are the opposite.
4) RESPONSE TIME
As C spends more time than other agents in the transaction, we define system response time (t r , the time our system takes to react to C's request) from the perspective of C.
There are many factors that affect the response time, including the time of retrieving data from Quorum's blockchain network t b , the time of downloading data through IPFS t s , the time of evaluating policy t e , and the network communication time t c (as we experiment in local network, t c is negligible). So, we have 
VII. RELATED WORK
So far, the proposals for advanced data sharing mainly focus on query-related, such as privacy-preserving, pricing private data [11] , dynamic data sharing or ad-hoc query [7] , query combination and optimization [35] , fair trading [36] , access control [34] . In their setting, C asks a request and pays for them; the market maker answers C and compensates O, as the query may leak O's privacy. For example, in [11] , C asks a query Q = (q, v) and pays π (Q); the market maker answers Q with privacy leakage (ε i ) and compensation µ i (Q).
Our model is similar to these projects in sharing data with ad-hoc query ( [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] ); nevertheless, all these work focuses on a particular domain. However, to the best of our knowledge, our model is the first one of integrating access controls, privacy-preserving, reputation management, pricing and compensation protocol with blockchain.
In terms of access controls, GUPT [34] uses a MAC (mandatory access control) framework and AppArmor (Application Armor, a Linux kernel security module) sandbox; DDV [37] employs smart contract and public key mechanism; instead of TTP (Trusted Third Party), fair data trading [36] makes use of fairly sign a contract.
Evaluating control policy by a centralized, trustworthy entity to one party does not mean credible to others. Blockchain, characterized by the consistency, public verifiability, etc., is an appropriate tool to perform policy evaluation in such an asymmetric untrustworthy environment.
As regarding to the implementation of access control based on blockchain, a few researches are viable. Such as, the objectives, models, architecture and mechanism (OM-AM) [33] ; the medical data sharing system based on blockchain [4] ; IoT access authorizations system [19] , [30] ; privacy and confidentiality protection system [12] ; runtime monitoring architecture [13] and ''Timed commitments'' mechanism based on Bitcoin [39] .
Comparing with existing methods, our model combines attribute-based and purpose-based access control, and involves obligations, conditions, price compensation. It considers the requirements of both C and O, and also is significantly different from Oathu2.0, 8 the prevalent authentication, authorization tool, which is widely used in the business sectors, as Google Map API, 9 Taobao API 10 In terms of privacy-preserving, GUPT [34] and DDV [37] adopt different privacy mechanism. Meanwhile, DDV [37] and fair data trading [36] make use of cryptography (as seriously time-consuming, we prefer to differential privacy). Nevertheless, they all need a centralized repository to store all O's data. In contrast, we aggregate each irrelevant query through ''SafeAnswer'' [26] mechanism and achieve differential privacy with the cooperation of dynamic consensus node clusters (purely distributed differential privacy). The accuracy and quality of the request data jointly determine the price of data.
In term of reputation management, O should not only enjoy the enhanced control and protection of their data, but also be encouraged by an appropriate way to take positive action. Each agent in our model has his/her particular role and obligation. O, for example, should maintain data renovation, data quality, etc. Therefore, we need a method to oversight agents' behaviors. The decentralized identity management system based on blockchain proposed by Liu et al. [15] and Kaaniche and Laurent [12] , is just right for our demand. As discussed in Section IV-C.2, we extend Liu's proposal by modifying reputation token, and by using dynamic standard deviation instead of the original static deviation. This makes our reputation score more suitable for evaluating real-time variability of credits about an agent.
In terms of pricing and compensation, various data price models have been proposed in the data sharing system, such as facilitating data market price model [10] , query-based data price model [40] , history-aware price model [41] , Internet-based views price model [42] , randomsampling-based price model [43] and the generic data pricing model [44] . Our price compensation is based on Li and Hacigümüs [7] , which assigns price to noisy query answers as a function of requestor's accuracy. Furthermore, we propose the personalized price mechanism (33) .
There is also some work based on blockchain. Zhang et al. [16] , [17] uses blockchain technologies in cloud service security. Ouaddah [32] proposes a blockchain-based research data sharing framework that incentives O by digital tokens. Yang et al. [45] presents a blockchain-based approach that enables O to control the anonymization process, and enhances the security of the services, by validating the usage of privacy budget and adaptively changing its allocation via smart contracts according to the privacy requirements of O. Table 8 summaries the differences between our proposal model and existing work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed blockchain (smart contract) as a data sharing enabler. First, we discussed the behavior pattern of agents, architecture of the model, data sharing process, reputation management and price mechanism. Then we designed a proof of a concept system that is running on Quorum. As discussed in Section V-C, we believe that the proposed data sharing model can solve some emergency problems, such as data storage based on blockchain, self-control, privacy preservation, price-balanced compensation, reliability, autonomy, incentive and reputation management.
However, numerous legacy challenges remain. First, we face the problem of over-consumption of privacy budget, i.e., how to compensate O reasonably in a low privacy consumption rate to increase the number of valid accesses to their data. There are two different solutions: one is proposed by Gkatzelis et al. [43] , which bundle the buyer's demands to decrease the price C has to pay. The other is proposed by LI et al. [35] , [45] , a state-memory access approach, in which the system checks whether a history released result can approximate the current query.
Second, in the cloud computing environment, data encryption [5] , [6] , [22] is the preference for ensuring data security. However, that how to efficiently implement cipher text computation and sharing remains an open question. Homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption [5] provide the solutions. We intend to integrate proxy re-encryption technology, in which the consensus nodes also act as proxy servers.
Third, in our model, we assume that the results requested by C are answered by a single query or a simple combination of multiple queries. We plan to utilize security multi-party computation to extend our model to support arbitrarily complex computation, as similar to Enigma [26] .
Fourth, dataset retrival, especial the search for queries or APIs, is more difficult than traditional text retrieves, and ranking the result further aggravates it [14] , [26] . We want to develop a dataset search engine like ''Dataset Search 11 '' of Google.
Finally, as a data storage platform, IPFS lacks of large-scale and parallel data processing capability. How to integrate IPFS with map-reduce model is our urgent problem. There are two viable alternatives, 1) Modify the IPFS infrastructure to make it support parallel processing. 2) Encapsulate IPFS into a platform supporting MapReduce computing model. 
